After the Hamas attack, Israeli retaliation tactics raised Gaza invasion fears.

Israel’s military has come together after an initial frantic scramble to stop an attack by the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas. It is now moving massive reinforcements toward the enclave while retaliating with airstrikes on highways, buildings, and other facilities in Gaza.

Many of the 2.3 million people who live in the area that Israeli soldiers left in 2005 fear that the mobilization and heavy shelling are the start of a ground invasion that would rival or even surpass Israel’s invasions in 2008 and 2014.

According to a security source in Israel, a ground attack is certain.

Yamen Hamad, a father of four, and others fled from Beit Hanoun near Gaza’s north border, where blast craters have rendered roads impassable and nearby buildings have been reduced to rubble. “People feared the bombardment of the border area was a tactic to create scorched earth before tanks advance,” said Hamad.

According to Israeli security officials, the operation that caught the Middle East’s most powerful army off guard on Saturday required more than 48 hours to restore military cohesiveness, stop infiltrations, and clear Hamas fighters from towns they attacked.

Over 1,000 Israelis were slain, and dozens of captives were taken by Hamas gunmen, who used a web of deception and relied on motorbikes, paragliders, and other common tools. This action might make an Israeli reaction more difficult.

Yet Israel has responded with ferociousness. At least 830 people were killed by airstrikes on Gaza on Tuesday, while more than 180,000 people lost their homes, according to U.N. statistics.

An Israeli ground assault, according to one security source in Israel who, like others, chose to remain unnamed, was “not preventable because of the heavy price that we paid.” This will follow the Air Force’s airstrikes.

You can’t just walk in,
According to the insider, the goal was to “soften the other side and within this, cause people to flee (built-up areas)”. Building force power, strategy, and surprise are further goals. You can’t just walk in.

In the lead-up to two previous Israeli ground operations in Gaza, destroying roads has been a common practice to obstruct communications and the movement of Hamas and other terrorists. To avoid landmines on existing roads, people claim that when Israel comes, its soldiers frequently bulldoze new pathways for their vehicles.

Even though Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promises “mighty revenge” in response to the significant casualties inflicted by the Hamas fighters in the worst breach of Israel’s strong defenses since Arab armies attacked in 1973, sending troops into a densely populated, urban environment is not an easy decision.

Former director of Israel’s National Security Council, Giora Eiland, claimed that although Israeli operations in the past had not succeeded in neutralizing Hamas, airstrikes in Gaza “seemed very similar to previous Israeli operations.”

According to Eiland, a ground invasion would be a more efficient way to eliminate Hamas members and disrupt the organization’s leadership structure. However, the government is still hesitant to take such a step since it may significantly increase Israeli losses.

Due to Iran, urban warfare pits Israel against a foe with more combat experience and better equipment, undermining its significant firepower advantage. The organization, which seized control of Gaza in 2007, also had time to develop a network of tunnels that aid in fighter-vanishing acts. Sometimes, Israeli soldiers refer to it as the “Gaza Metro”.

Israel lost nine troops in their invasion in 2008. The number of fatalities increased to 66 in 2014.

This time, Hamas also has scores of captives that it took during the operation on October 7—many of them are civilians, but some are military. It poses a significant issue for a country whose guiding philosophy is to leave no one behind. In 2011, it consented to swap one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who had been held captive by hundreds of Palestinian detainees for five years.

Pay a steep price.
According to Talal Okal, a Gaza-based analyst contributing to the daily Al-Ayyam newspaper, “Israel knows the great preparedness of the resistance factions and their ability to handle ground incursions,” adding that Israel may still be hesitant to launch a land invasion.

“It wants to make Gaza pay a heavy price, but I don’t think it is prepared to pay the heavier prices should they enter Gaza,” he stated.

The administration has not decided on the deployment of soldiers despite Israel amassing forces on the border with Gaza and calling up hundreds of thousands of reservists.

Residents of Gaza said on Wednesday that other roadways, including a crucial beachfront route, were among the areas struck overnight. Targets reportedly included a Hamas surveillance camera network, weapons storage and manufacturing sites, and operating tunnels, according to Israel’s military.

Major Amir Dinar, a spokesman for the Israeli military, responded when asked about a potential ground invasion: “We are striking Hamas infrastructure and we are going to strike hard and keep striking.” He said nothing further.

Both the foreign ministry and the office of the Israeli prime minister declined to comment.

For this piece, two Hamas officials were unavailable for comment.

An unnamed representative of a Palestinian terrorist group said: “There is a history between 2008, 2014, and 2023. The opposition is no longer as weak or unprepared as before.

“We are constantly ready. The official continued that they would be captives or bodies if Israel sent additional forces in.

By commencing its offensive on October 7, Hamas has already shown that it is a tougher and more competent force than Israel had anticipated.

Israel, which has prided itself on its capacity to infiltrate and keep track of terrorists, suffered a severe intelligence failure due to the Palestinian operation. Additionally, it revealed holes in Israel’s southern command.

“Southern command and communication broke down, and there was no communication. It took some time to grasp the situation fully, according to David Tzur, a former commander of Israel’s Border Police and the Yamam special counterterrorism squad. But the power above has since healed.

“Once all forces are on alert, there is a quick reaction.”